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Abstract 
This article examines foreign aid and government funding to NGOs as forms of patronage, and 
explores the impact of such funding on the nature and role of civil society.  Using qualitative 
research from Palestine and Morocco, we argue that patronage transforms NGOs into 
apparatuses of governing. NGOs become key sites for the exercise of productive power through 
the technologies of professionalization, bureaucratization and upward accountability. The article 
explores how this transformation of NGOs depoliticizes their work while undermining their role 
as change agents within civil society.  The findings have implications for understanding the 
transformation of NGOs, the relationship between patrons and their grantees, and, finally, for 
exploring the limitations of NGOs as vehicles for social change in sensitive political 
environments.  
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1.0 Introduction 
In the past few decades, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have taken center stage 
for their theorized role as the sine-qua-non of civil society (Carapico, 2012).  A global consensus 
emerged that celebrated NGOs as less bureaucratic than government agencies, more connected to 
the populations served, and thus better able to implement development solutions and advocate 
for social change (Bebbington, 1997; Clark, 1995; Howell & Pearce, 2001).  However, as NGOs 
came to rely on external funding-streams, their role within civil society changed; in certain cases 
they became depoliticized and disconnected from the grassroots communities they purported to 
represent.   
Examining both government and foreign aid to NGOs as patronage (defined below), we 
argue that under systems of patronage, NGOs function as apparatuses of governing.  We use 
governing to connote the instrumentalization of power “to shape actions, processes and outcomes 
in desired directions” (N. Rose, 1999, p. 4).  By governing, patrons do not “crush the capacity” 
of NGOs to act but rather “acknowledge it and to utilize it for [the patron’s] own objectives” (N. 
Rose, 1999, p. 4). The networks between patrons and grantees are often diffuse, with “no one 
centralized nucleus of authority that controls political access” (Jamal, 2007, pp. 14-15).  Rather, 
power is disturbed among a variety of actors, who deploy technologies of governing through 
diverse channels of influence that inhibit organizations “capacity for autonomous action” 
(Devine, 2006, p. 93). We assert that patrons govern through technologies of professionalization, 
bureaucratization and increased upward accountability.  Collectively, the impact of these 
technologies is the depoliticization of NGO agendas, diluting activism and prioritizing service 
provision.  This new function of NGOs challenges the normative assumptions that they operate 
as key vehicles for the development of civil society.  Furthermore, we argue that NGOs become 
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key sites for the exercise of power; this form of productive power limits NGOs’ sustainability, 
legitimacy, and effectiveness as change agents within civil society. 
We use the term “patronage” to describe an unequal power relationship between NGOs 
and their funders, one marked by dependence and mutual accountability. Both the funder 
(patron) and grant recipient (NGO) benefit from being in an exchange relationship with the other 
(Nownes, 1995).  The benefit to the patron is the advancement or achievement of a policy goal, 
which is obtained through the work of the NGO (Goss, 2007; Reckhow, 2016; Walker, 
1983).  The patron’s priorities prevail, as the funder treats the grantee as its agent and the grantee 
implements the donor’s agenda (Brulle & Jenkins, 2005; Lowry, 1999; Nownes, 1995; Walker, 
1983). As patrons wield influence through their funding, organizations professionalize and shift 
their accountability from members to funders (Brulle & Jenkins, 2005; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; 
Lowry, 1999). The NGO benefits from the financial resources offered by the patron, which are 
crucial to the organization’s survival.  NGOs express loyalty to the patron and its agenda in order 
to obtain funding (Lowry, 1999; Schatzmiller, 2001). The link between the funder and the grant 
recipient is hierarchical and “reinforce(s) vertical linkages” between patrons and grantees, at the 
expense of “horizontal linkages among associations” and between associations and their 
members (Jamal, 2007, p. 14; see also Papakostas, 2012; Skocpol, 2003). Relationships of 
patronage occur when organizations lose their autonomy, become dependent on their funders and 
increasingly implement their funders’ agendas. 
In our two case studies, Palestine and Morocco, the NGO sectors witnessed rapid growth 
since the introduction of patronage as the main source of funding for NGOs. In Palestine, the 
patronage came from foreign aid and in Morocco it was government funding. Prior to patronage, 
NGOs were less professional, more accountable to communities and inclined to take up 
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controversial agendas (Bergh, 2012; Challand, 2009; Hammami, 2000).  In both cases, as a result 
of patronage, NGOs witnessed rapid professionalization, experienced increased regulation and 
surveillance and were held accountable to donors instead of communities. We refer to these as 
technologies of governing and demonstrate how they led to the depoliticization of the NGO 
sectors and to crises of sustainability and legitimacy.  After patronage, NGOs felt restrained by 
what they could say and do politically and were reticent to engage in contentious collective 
action.  Rather than providing the bedrock for a citizen-owned, change-oriented civil society, 
patron-driven NGO sectors became tools of their donors.  
2.0 Data and Methods 
Our research design followed a comparative case study method. We gathered primary 
data through fieldwork in Morocco and Palestine between 2014 and 2016.  Fieldwork in 
Morocco took place from September-December 2014; March-August 2015; and May-December 
2016. Fieldwork in Palestine occurred from May-August 2016.  We draw primarily from 50 
semi-structured interviews conducted in-country with leaders of 45 local NGOs mainly based in 
the capital cities of Ramallah, Palestine and Rabat, Morocco.  We also conducted field visits, 
observed meetings and conferences of civil society actors, and reviewed primary documents such 
as annual reports, funding proposals, progress reports and websites.  We reviewed secondary 
literature including news reports, research publications and conference proceedings. 
Contacts were made using snowball sampling through personal contacts and social 
networks, opening doors that would otherwise remain closed in sensitive political contexts.  We 
recognize the selection bias inherent in nonrandom sampling.  However, in both contexts there is 
no centralized NGO database that would permit random sampling.  To minimize bias, we 
deliberately included a variety of organizations—service, advocacy and hybrid. While these 
 5 
categories do not fully capture the breadth of work conducted by the NGOs, we included 
organizations working across a wide-spectrum of topics including education, housing, 
environmental protection, human rights, economic development, social/human development, arts 
and culture, women, youth and healthcare provision. While organizations conscientiously and 
selectively present themselves to donors in particular ways that might lead to grants, because of 
our positionality and embeddedness in broader networks throughout the research process, we are 
confident that our interview findings do not suffer from this bias. We also triangulate our 
interview findings with ethnographic participant observation and conversations with in-country 
experts.   
Interviews ranged in structure and length and were not recorded.  Most were prearranged, 
semi-structured, lasted for approximately one hour and were conducted in the interviewees’ 
offices or cafes.  Others were less structured, occurred spontaneously and bled into day-long 
field visits.  We deployed open-ended questions to encourage interviewees to freely expound 
upon their organizations’ goals, operations, membership bases, sources of funding and 
relationships with funders and their broader views on local civil society.  We also asked NGO 
representatives about their career backgrounds, their organizations’ histories, and their views of 
the local government, foreign aid and the broader regional context.  
In sectors marked by fear, intimidation, and strong security apparatuses, recording 
devices would almost certainly have led to self-censorship and limited our access.  Furthermore, 
given the political contexts of our cases, interviews were conducted with oral consent.  All 
interviews were anonymized to protect the identities of our interlocutors and in compliance with 
Institutional Review Board requirements at both authors’ institutions.  Interviews in Palestine 
were conducted solely in English, while interviews in Morocco were conducted in Arabic, 
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French, and English, and occasionally in Tashlehit (a local dialect) with a translator.  Notes were 
transcribed and translated into English immediately after the interview.  
While the research in-country was completed individually by the researchers, the analysis 
of data was completed collectively. We coded and annotated the field notes thematically. Once a 
set of concepts and themes emerged, we then analyzed and organized the observations according 
to the themes, which enabled us to examine the data from Morocco and Palestine concurrently. 
Using an abductive approach, we iteratively compared the findings from the data to existing 
theories, creating a steady “dialogue” between the two (Ragin, 1987).  
3.0 The Cases 
We chose Palestine and Morocco as comparative cases because of their changing NGO 
landscapes. Each country experienced rapid and expansive NGO growth fueled by patronage. 
Whereas growth of an NGO sector is often described in the literature as positive because it 
signifies a strengthening of civil society (Bratton, 1989; Diamond, 1994; Fisher, 1998; Putnam, 
1993, 2000), in contrast, the growth of the NGO sectors in our cases was described to us as 
bloating, connoting that the growth had a negative impact. We were intrigued that both sectors 
bloated under different sources of patronage—foreign aid in the case of Palestine and 
government funding in the case of Morocco—and wanted to further investigate the nuanced 
effects of these two different forms of patronage. 
There are approximately 3,000 NGOs operating in Palestine and 116,000 in Morocco. 
Rather than arising organically from the grassroots, NGO sector growth in both contexts has 
been largely patron-driven.  Prior to the Oslo Accords, which in 1993 created the Palestinian 
Authority that today governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian civil society 
organizations and activists engaged in a political struggle for self-determination (Challand, 2009; 
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Hammami, 2000).  Palestine’s NGO sector grew rapidly after the signing of the Oslo Accords, 
which introduced an influx of foreign aid.  Since Oslo, foreign donors have directed funds to 
NGOs under the rubric of civil society building and democracy promotion, doubling donations 
from $112 million in 1999 to $223.6 million in 2006 (Turner, 2014).  Foreign donors channeled 
funds to NGOs as the Palestinian Authority struggled to govern and as the Israeli occupation 
became further entrenched (Challand, 2009; Turner, 2014).  As one interlocutor told us, the NGO 
sector ballooned “because of the occupation. There is no government so NGOs had to take care 
of what the government didn’t do.  The number of NGOs in Palestine is the highest per capita” 
(author interview, Beit Sahour, June 20, 2016).  
Since the death of Morocco’s first post-colonial King, Hassan II, Mohammed VI’s 
transition to power in 1999 was marked by a rapid period of liberalization that created some 
space for active associational life.  While the 2002 revision of the country’s Decree on the Right 
to Establish Associations liberalized the legal environment for NGOs, the Kingdom still 
maintains control over the sector and those working on sensitive issues face repression 
(International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2016).  In response to international criticism of 
Morocco’s vast regional inequalities, the King initiated the National Initiative for Human 
Development (INDH) in 2005 (Bergh, 2012).  NGOs grew exponentially as a slew of funds went 
to support infrastructure and human development projects implemented by local NGOs, “The 
problem of bloating of the NGO sector is that some 30-40 per cent of NGOs in Morocco today 
were created for the INDH. But the INDH has no strategy. It just gives money out” (author 
interview, Rabat, October 27, 2014).  Another NGO leader stated, “In Morocco today we have 
100,000 associations.  Imagine, and the majority of them were created as a result of 
INDH.  Forty per cent of associations were formed without any purpose other than to benefit 
 8 
from the INDH funds” (author interview, Rabat, October 24, 2014).  Between 2011 and 2015, 
the INDH funneled $1.7 billion to NGOs and led to a spike in the number of NGOs registered in 
the country (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2016).  In both contexts, Palestine and 
Morocco, NGO growth was spurred by the presence of a patron, fundamentally changing the role 
of NGOs within civil society. 
4.0 NGOs’ Changing Role in Civil Society 
The dominant literature on NGOs frames them as hallmarks of a vibrant civil society and 
a liberalized state.  Scholars narrate NGOs as key sites of collective empowerment where 
citizens come together to express a plurality of interests and mobilize to promote change 
(Diamond, 1994; Putnam, 1993; Tocqueville, (1835) 2003).  According to this narrative, NGOs 
cultivate tolerance, respect, and civic participation among members, serve as watchdogs over the 
state, and act as vehicles through which citizens advance their interests in policy arenas (Berry & 
Arons, 2003).  Through their efforts to safeguard and promote the interests of marginalized 
groups, pluralize the public sphere, and check state power, NGOs are seen as part and parcel of a 
healthy civil society (Carapico, 2012).   
Since the 1980s, NGOs have also been heralded as more efficient and effective service 
providers than state agencies (Bebbington, 1997).  Their programs are thought to be more cost-
effective, innovative, and participatory than those provided by bulky government agencies, 
leading to an explosion in the number of NGOs (Hulme & Edwards, 1996).  Across the Global 
South, bilateral aid and multilateral institutions shifted their funding away from states and toward 
NGOs.  Grants for projects related to poverty alleviation, social welfare, human rights, and 
democracy building went directly to NGOs rather than to government bodies (AbouAssi, 2013; 
Clarke, 1998; Fowler, 1991).  In the wake of neoliberalism and structural adjustment, many 
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governments also encouraged the growth of NGOs as they privatized their economies, rolled 
back the welfare state, and delegated service provision to contractors. In the name of 
development and civil society building, both foreign aid and governments bankrolled NGO 
sectors (Atia, 2013; Cox, 2009; P. Rose, 2011). 
The associational revolution has not worked out as planned. Disparate literatures use the 
phrase “NGO-ization” to connote the negative impacts of on the one hand, foreign aid, and on 
the other, government patronage (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015; Chahim & Prakash, 2014; 
Jad, 2003).  Scholars have found that both are correlated with the professionalization, 
depoliticization, and upward accountability of NGOs, rather than bolstering grassroots 
organizations with politicized missions and ultimate accountability to their beneficiaries (Bano, 
2008; Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Suárez & Gugerty, 2016; Wiktorowicz, 2000).  These negative 
impacts are observed regardless of the source of funding (foreign aid or government 
funds).  Bringing both types of patrons together in the same study, we theorize the effects of 
patronage, and argue that, regardless of the source of funds, patronage significantly diminishes 
NGOs’ role in building and sustaining civil society.  
We turn to Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality to analyze the productive power 
of patronage because, “political power is exercised today through a profusion of shifting 
alliances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic 
activity, social life and individual conduct” (N. Rose & Miller, 2008, p. 53).  Governmentality 
“offers a lens to understand how power is exercised in society through varied social relations, 
institutions, and ‘bodies’ that do not automatically fit under the rubric of the ‘state’.  It enables us 
to see how rule is secured, sometimes in tenuous ways, through a variety of not necessarily 
coordinated methods and by a web of institutional and social arrangements” (Sharma & Gupta, 
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2006, p. 25).  We argue that patronage works as a form of productive power, and governing 
occurs through political rationalities and governmental technologies.  Political rationalities are 
“the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, the moral 
justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the 
appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of 
such tasks,” while government technologies are “the complex of mundane programmes, 
calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek 
to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions” (N. Rose & Miller, 2008, p. 55).  Political 
rationalities and governmental technologies enable governing “at a distance” (N. Rose & Miller, 
2008, p. 34). 
Governing at a distance occurs through a diversity of actors.  In our cases, patronage 
enables funders to govern through NGOs.  It is worth noting that while in the Moroccan case the 
government is directly involved in governing through this network of NGOs, in the Palestinian 
case we take governing to mean foreign funders’ exercise of power and authority to wield 
influence over Palestinian NGOs.  In both cases, though, we argue that political power is 
exercised through NGOs and enforced and made durable through a patronage system.  The 
patronage system works as a form of governing in dispersed and subtle ways.  
5.0 Technologies of Governing 
We conceptualize NGO patronage as a form of governmentality invoking three 
technologies of governing: professionalization, bureaucratization and upward 
accountability.  Professionalization results from complex application procedures and reporting 
requirements that require grantees to quantify the results of their work.  In order to meet 
application and reporting demands, NGOs are forced to hire highly trained staff with technical 
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and language skills and situate themselves in modern, high-tech offices.  Professionalization in 
turn transforms NGO sectors into highly lucrative industries.  The monitoring and reporting 
requirements that accompany funding from patrons impose multiple layers of bureaucracy on 
NGOs.  Organizations must adapt their practices, dedicating staff time and resources to filling 
out regular reports and adjusting their approach to be able to demonstrate quantifiable 
results.  Frequent monitoring and reporting also provides the patron with a window into, and 
ongoing influence over, organizations’ work.  Unequal power relations lead NGOs to shift their 
accountabilities from citizens to their donors.  In order to secure the funding they need to 
survive, organizations adopt, or at minimum adhere to, the priorities of their donors.  This often 
results in mission drift.  In the following section, we present the literature’s conceptualization of 
professionalization, bureaucratization and upward accountability, and deploy evidence from our 
interviews to argue that these served as technologies of governing in both Palestine and 
Morocco. 
5.1 Professionalization 
In order to apply for funding, NGOs must be highly professionalized (Alexander, Nank, 
& Stivers, 2004; Bratton, 1989; Suárez & Gugerty, 2016).  Professionalization is cultivated 
through practices of development (i.e. proposals, projects, monitoring and evaluation) as well as 
particular forms of knowledge production (i.e. quantification, technical knowledge and language 
skills).  In order to secure funding, NGOs must develop project-based proposals that are 
structured like business plans.  Applicants must clearly summarize the proposed scope of work, 
lay out a strategic plan, detail a budget, and build a logic model that identifies causal links 
between inputs and outputs (Bebbington, 1997; Bornstein, 2003; Stiles, 2002).  Organizations 
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must also specify how they will measure progress towards their goals using quantitative metrics 
and prove efficient use of resources (AbouAssi, 2013; Ebrahim, 2005). 
Monitoring and evaluation practices require data acquisition and measurement, leading to 
an over-reliance on quantification.  In order to manage grants, NGOs must hire staff with 
mastery of the technical vernacular of the development-business industrial complex (Bano, 2008; 
Bornstein, 2003; Suarez & Gugerty, 2016).  Staff members must also be conversant in the 
language of funders, often English (Elbers & Arts, 2011; Henderson, 2003; Jad, 2007).  The 
combination of practices of development and particular forms of knowledge production turn the 
sector into a lucrative industry.  Jobs in such professionalized NGOs tend to be high paying and 
offer other perks such as modern, high-tech, air-conditioned offices, access to vehicles, and 
receptions at fancy hotels (Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Hammami, 2000; Hanafi & Tabar, 2003).   
Evidence from our cases confirms professionalization of Palestine’s and Morocco’s NGO 
sectors.  Rather than supporting NGOs’ general missions, patrons funded projects, “There is a 
supermarket of projects, and organizations must see which fits best with their work.  Also 
[grants] last from three months to at most one year.  One year is long.  Three to six months is 
common” (author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  NGO staff also indicated that the 
application processes require a lot of resources and technical knowledge, “There is a really 
annoying part of an aid application called a ‘log frame.’  Applicants must list activities, 
indicators of success, measurement, results, and offer to provide photos and press releases.  This 
is a total waste of time, money, and effort.  It makes us more dependent to learn the whole 
process” (author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  Receipt of funding requires the 
“ability to monitor the efficiency of programs, and produce viable projects and discounts 
consideration of local dynamics” (author interview, Rabat, October 19, 2014).  
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Some indicated that impact of their work was also limited by an over-reliance on 
quantification, “INDH favors quantitative and replicable projects.  They favor scaling up, they 
see, ‘Oh this worked here in Rabat, let’s implement 40,000 of them all over the country.’  This is 
not a strategy, you can’t just plop a project down somewhere and expect it to work” (author 
interview, Rabat, October 27, 2014).  This emphasis on quantitative metrics measured outputs, 
not outcomes, “Another problem with the aid system is that success is not about the number of 
participants in workshops.  If anything should be measured it is the number of kids in jail” 
(author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  Discussing the exclusion of grassroots NGOs, 
one evaluation specialist argued that these “NGOs, because they lack the knowhow, expertise, 
experience and ability to collect quantitative data,” were not competitive for funding (author 
interview, Rabat, September 29, 2014).  Organizations saw the limits of focusing solely on 
quantitative metrics, “How does one measure impact?  I’ve been reflecting on this.  We have 
never done an impact study, it is high time that we try…Financial return is fantastic but worries 
me.  Social change should be at the heart” (author interview, Ramallah, June 18, 2016). 
The emphasis on development practices and technical knowledge turned the NGO sectors 
not only into industries but lucrative industries; individuals often sought employment in the 
sector as a well-paying job, “People are quitting their jobs in the private sector and going to the 
NGO sector because they pay higher salaries.  The incentive is financial, there is money in it” 
(author interview, Ramallah, June 16, 2016).  Interlocutors suggested that individuals were 
drawn to NGO work because, “one must create an association in order to benefit [financially]” 
(author’s focus group, Tinghir, September 1, 2016).  They were motivated by both financial 
returns and prestige, “There is high unemployment.  There are no opportunities here, people 
cannot travel, so they open an NGO in order to have status” (author interview, Ramallah, July 
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21, 2016).  Or, as another NGO leader put it, “People want to be in the NGO system because 
they want better jobs” (author interview, Ramallah, May 31, 2016).  We were told numerous 
times that the NGO sector was one of the better paying opportunities for employment and that 
many saw the sector as a career boost, “The NGO sector in Palestine is a career ladder. If you 
want to get to an international NGO you go through a national NGO” (author interview, 
Ramallah, March 16, 2015).  Another noted, “Contractors, bankers, and civil society directors 
are people connected to aid...Most NGO work is based upon materialistic incentives.  They hold 
events in fancy hotels, people joke about it” (author interview, Ramallah, June 16, 2016).  
5.2 Bureaucratization 
Bureaucratization is related to professionalization but entails a plethora of reporting and 
surveillance techniques that patrons use to monitor their grantees.  As Feldman argues, “rather 
than measuring practice against policy—whether to judge the degree of perfection in its 
enactment or to highlight the failures of ideal types in capturing bureaucratic complexity...we 
need to consider this practice itself productive of governing form, intent and direction” 
(Feldman, 2008, p. 14).  While bureaucratic requirements are often seen as tedious and 
procedural, these practices require organizations to transform their organizational structure and 
operations in order to comply.  In effect, then, bureaucracy is a key apparatus of governing. 
Patrons require frequent, regular and detailed reporting on all aspects of organizational 
governance, operations and finances (Bebbington, 1997; Herrold, 2016; Wiktorowicz, 2000). 
Such monitoring is often extensive and intrusive, requiring significant staff time. 
Bureaucratization restrains grantees and gives patrons a window into, and influence over, all 
aspects of a funded project as well as more general organizational operations (Bornstein, 2003).  
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Our interlocutors frequently recounted stories of how monitoring required “significant 
time investments” and “visible evidence of outputs” (author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 
2016).  One NGO leader lamented the over-valuing of procedural accountability imposed by 
patrons, pointing out that patrons, “roll out huge amounts of money but also require [grantees] to 
follow certain rules and regulations.  The end result is that many NGOs, I can’t generalize 
because many are still good, but many NGOs lost their objectives as they became 
bureaucratized...Directors became obsessed with, and required to follow, bureaucracy” (author 
interview, Rabat, October 2, 2014).  
While patrons directly required grantees to bureaucratize, the government, through the 
Ministries of Interior, facilitated the bureaucratization of NGOs by monitoring and interfering in 
the work of the sector.  As one Palestinian NGO leader put it, “there is more oversight than 
before from the government, (and) it is increasing. One needs to answer question from the 
intelligence agency to register and board meeting minutes must be given to the Ministry of the 
Interior” (author interview, Ramallah, May 31, 2016).  Another concurred, “The Ministry of the 
Interior is increasingly interfering.  They have a list of NGOs and attend Board of Governors 
annual meetings” (author interview, Beit Sahour, June 20, 2016).  
In Morocco, the patron is the government and the strategic placement of INDH within the 
Ministry of Interior had particular salience, “it created an entire civil society attached to the 
Ministry of Interior” (author interview, Rabat, October 27, 2014).  Interviewees questioned the 
relationship between human development the state security apparatus, “Let’s look at the scope 
and impact of INDH.  Even ONDH [National Observatory for Human Development] found that 
the impact was limited, and that it was mostly a matter of governance, everything goes through 
the Ministry of Interior. This begs the question, what does the Ministry of the Interior know 
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about development? It is about control, instrumentation, controlling the population” (author 
interview, Rabat, November 5, 2014).  
5.3 Upward Accountability 
NGOs that are heavily dependent on external resources become locked into unequal 
relationships in which the patron wields power over the NGO (AbouAssi & Trent, 2016; 
Bornstein, 2003; Elbers & Arts, 2011; Habib & Taylor, 1999).  NGOs respond by adopting and 
fulfilling their funders’ development priorities (Porter, 2003).  In order to earn funding, NGOs 
shift their accountability away from their beneficiaries and upward toward the patron (Chahim & 
Prakash, 2014; Ebrahim, 2005; Suarez & Gugerty, 2016).  In doing so, they often become 
“memberless organizations” (Papakostas, 2012, p. 146), small shops heavily subsidized by 
patrons and providing a particular service to beneficiaries. Organizational resources, and the 
mandate that comes from those resources, are provided not by members but by external patrons. 
They also potentially fall prey to mission drift (Bebbington, 1997; Bornstein, 2003).  The results 
are patron/grantee relations marked by dependence and through which patrons extract loyalty 
and advance their objectives (Cox, 2009; Elyachar, 2005; Jamal, 2007).  Meanwhile, NGOs lose 
not only their independence but also their capacity to represent the public and champion 
beneficiaries’ interests (Jad, 2003; Stacher, 2012).    
The NGOs in our study indicated that the unequal power relations inherent in patronage 
forced them to cater to donor priorities rather than adhere to their own missions.  As one 
interlocutor said, “Donors use money to get you to implement their agenda.  We battle hard not 
to do that” (author interview, Ramallah, March 16, 2015).  Another added, “Donors come with 
political agendas that needy Palestinian organizations have to accept and adopt.  Not only 
political agendas, but also definitions of what development is.  Aid is top-down.  We believe in 
 17 
bottom-up work.  With top-down we must use their language and do their projects” (author 
interview, Ramallah, June 16, 2016).  They felt that patron-funded projects “don’t draw on local 
wisdom.  The little money that is good–that does do good locally–comes as a tag-on to all of the 
bad” (author interview, Ramallah, March 16, 2015).  
NGOs felt they could not argue with the agendas imposed upon them, “It was a top-down 
project, it was not open to discussion, it was always centralized...this took money away from 
those who were really working on [grassroots] initiatives” (author interview, Rabat, October 24, 
2014).  Others shared the sentiment that grassroots initiatives were crowded out, “The private 
sector and international donors cannot do community-led work.  They can do community work 
but not community-led work, because they cannot give up control” (author interview, Ramallah, 
March 16, 2015).  Some felt that the larger the NGO, the less accountable they were to 
constituents, “Large NGOs don’t lack money but they lack accountability.  They don’t have local 
support. They are better at communicating with donors than with [us]” (author interview, 
Ramallah, March 16, 2015).  
Patrons demanded loyalty and compliance with their agendas.  One NGO described a 
political tit-for-tat, “It is well known that the presidents of communes were creating associations 
to benefit them politically, and that there were rounds of politics and a political game to 
benefiting from the INDH money.  It was entirely oriented towards clientelism” (author 
interview, Rabat, November 15, 2014).  Patronage created a power relationship in which 
grantees either put up or shut up; an NGO told us, “A European Union (EU) funder required us 
to partner with an Israeli organization.  We said no, this is normalization. The EU told us to 
partner with a Palestinian organization in Israel and they would look the other way.  We said no, 
the EU should cancel this program…We have been broke since then” (author interview, East 
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Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  Loyalty was awarded, and disloyalty punished, “if you are not in 
good relations with the commune president, you will not benefit from any INDH funding for 
associations” (author focus group, Tinghir, October 15, 2016).  
6.0 Depoliticizing the NGO Sector 
Scholars have argued that foreign aid and government funding depoliticizes NGOs 
(Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Hanafi & Tabar, 2003; Jad, 2007).  Professionalization, 
bureaucratization and upward accountability to donors draw NGOs away from politically 
sensitive topics and towards service provision (Stiles, 2002).  We analyze how the deployment of 
technologies of governing (professionalization, bureaucratization and upward accountability) 
contributes to this depoliticization.  
The development of project-based proposals with logic models and measurable outcomes 
channels organizations’ work into discrete, short-term projects with immediately visible results, 
leaving little room for the creativity, flexibility and long time horizons required to mobilize 
grassroots constituencies or engage in sustained collective action (Bornstein, 2003).  Funding for 
general operations and grassroots advocacy is rarely provided (Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Elbers 
& Arts, 2011). As organizations increasingly rely on these short-term, project-based funding 
streams, they lose the organizational capacity to pursue transformative change initiatives 
(Ebrahim, 2005).  Reporting, monitoring, and surveillance requirements imposed by foreign aid 
and government funding depoliticizes NGOs, as the time and resources required to remain in 
compliance take away from the passion and mandate of organizations (Hammami, 2000).    
Upward accountability also accelerates NGO depoliticization (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003; 
Stiles, 2002).  Through subtle and not-so-subtle messages from the patron, NGOs understand that 
taking on political work jeopardizes their funding (Herrold & Atia, 2016).  Fear of biting the 
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hand that feeds them leads NGOs to cooperate with the patron’s agenda, rather than challenge 
prevailing power structures (Allard, 2014; Smith & Lipsky, 1993).  NGOs move “from protest to 
proposal” (Regulska, 1999, p. 65) as they realize that funding is more easily secured when they 
work in collaboration with the patron. 
Our interlocutors discussed the ways in which their work was depoliticized—they were 
encouraged to prioritize humanitarian work and service delivery over advocacy and de-radicalize 
their agendas.  NGOs told us that patrons encourage humanitarian and service-oriented NGO 
work rather than political organizing or advocacy, “More and more the aid is humanitarian.  This 
is dangerous because it is transforming how the Palestinian case is dealt with.  It becomes 
humanitarian rather than political.  It absolves Israel from responsibility...post Oslo, 80 per cent 
of aid was development and 20 per cent was humanitarian.  Today, it is the reverse.  The 
language being used in requests for proposals is depoliticized—e.g. poor, vulnerable.  There is 
no political context” (author interview, Ramallah, June 16, 2016).  In a focus group with 
Moroccan NGO leaders, they echoed the sense that INDH funded depoliticized projects, “The 
government contributed more to management of canal irrigation and road building than to 
[empowering] participatory development projects” (author focus group, Tinghir, November 5, 
2016).  
NGO leaders felt that patrons forced depoliticized agendas, “The West won’t fund groups 
that are rebellious, revolutionary, and think about how to change the status quo.  Instead they 
ameliorate the status quo.  They make it easier to live under occupation, but not free from 
occupation” (author interview, Beit Sahour, June 20, 2016).  They clearly asserted that funding 
streams were deliberately directed to undermine radical agendas, in the case of Morocco, calls 
for democratization and/or autonomy, in the case of Palestine, calls for an end to the occupation. 
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Many Moroccan activists believed that the INDH funding deliberately crowded-out 
associations that were critical of the government, “There was a huge change to the state of the 
civil society after the INDH; they were able to dispose of civil society, to create their own 
organizations in the name of civil society that are registered as NGOs, but that are actually 
agents of the state.  This is very different from the militant activism that dominated civil society 
before, and it was also a way to delegitimize the NGO sector” (author interview, Rabat, 
November 5, 2014).  This was a marked change from a previous era, “Before in the 1970s, civil 
society was dominated by militant activists.  Now we see local authorities working to create 
associations.  So, this is diluting the work of militants” (author interview, Rabat, November 5, 
2014). 
The leader of a Palestinian NGO saw patronage as “hushing money, to maintain the 
status quo rather than solve the situation…But the occupation is still a major obstacle...aid 
fragments issues and topics. We need aid because of the occupation, however aid’s focus on 
women, disabled, etc. misses the main point.  Palestinians pay the price of fragmentation.  It puts 
the occupation into parts” (author interview, Ramallah, June 16, 2016).  Aid directly transformed 
the activist orientation of the NGO sector, “The NGO community was very strong and preserved 
Palestine before Oslo.  It used to be powerful.  In the last five years, it became weak because of 
donor driven issues” (author interview, Ramallah, July 21, 2016). 
Donors diluted resistance to the occupation in part through conditionality, “USAID asked 
them [an NGO] to sign a document that indicated they would comply with the US policy on 
contracts with terrorist organizations (to not work with terrorist organizations).  This is 
impossible.  It includes almost every Palestinian organization working on resistance.  Most 
people belong to these factions” (author interview, Beit Sahour, June 20, 2016).  In order to 
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attain funding, NGOs had to be willing to work with Israelis, “We get requests for proposals all 
the time from bilateral aid groups to work with Israeli organizations.  No thank you, that is 
normalization” (author interview, Beit Sahour, June 20, 2016).  Another organization recounted 
the cost of non-compliance, “Some NGOs are suffering because they have values and don’t sign 
the US anti-terrorism policy and don’t cooperate with Israel.  There is a lot of money available 
for these projects but the organizations won’t and can’t take it” (author interview, Ramallah, July 
21, 2016). 
7.0 Impotent Organs of Civil Society  
In the eyes of our interlocutors, patronage led to crises of sustainability and undermined 
the legitimacy of the NGO sector. As a result, NGO leaders were self-critical of the sector, 
suggesting that it had become an impotent organ of civil society, “My hunch is that everyone 
sees that NGO-ization doesn’t work.  As Palestinians, we are angry.  It has changed our state of 
mind from community organizing, creativity, and independence to dependence and always 
expecting help” (author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  The cost of a patron-driven 
NGO sector was a weakened and docile civil society, “What we lost in the process is a free, truly 
free civil society, cultural, social, human rights.  The other problem is that it created an entire 
civil society attached to the Ministry of the Interior, that can serve the Ministry for whatever 
purpose—that, in actuality, is not a civil society at all” (author interview, Rabat, October 27, 
2014). 
Patron-driven NGOs became so financially dependent upon their funders that they feared 
this dependency threatened the long-term sustainability of the sector.  Patrons are notoriously 
fickle, frequently changing their agendas and funding priorities (Henderson, 
2002).  Organizations worried that when the money disappeared so would they.  NGOs 
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recounted their dependence upon the funding stream of the patron, “We began in 2011 and the 
grant ended in June 2014.  We still had salaries for about six to seven months after the grant 
ended.  Since then, no more salaries.  Most money goes to rent” (author interview, East 
Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  There was also the sense that NGOs set up to benefit from patrons 
were less dedicated and therefore more disposable, as one NGO director put it, “The ones that 
were set up by aid will die” (author interview, Ramallah, May 31, 2016).  
NGOs attributed the crisis of sustainability explicitly to donors, “They (international 
donors) are creating our problems…We have excellent people here but they are frustrated by the 
occupation and by donors.  Donors ask us about sustainability and I want to ask, ‘Are you 
sustainable in Palestine?’  They come for two years and leave.  This is a fiasco all over the world 
in conflict zone areas.  NGOs are flourishing” (author interview, Ramallah, July 21, 
2016).  Thus, NGOs saw dependence on the patron as a liability for civil society, “NGOs in 
Palestine are dependent upon international aid and this creates distortions” (author interview, 
Ramallah, March 16, 2015).  Patronage kept the sector dependent on its lifeline, “most income is 
from foreign aid.  Aid is ‘consumed’ but not ‘invested’” (author interview, Ramallah, June 16, 
2016). Rather than propel the sector forward it created fragility—if the patron pulled the plug on 
the lifeline, the sector would unravel.   
Patronage reduced NGOs’ legitimacy by undermining their role as change agents within 
civil society, “Overall if we look at INDH, it has had a negative impact on civil society because 
it has created a huge number of associations that aren’t really interested in civil society” (author 
interview, Rabat, November 5, 2014).  NGOs saw patronage as a broken system and were 
pessimistic about it changing, “Aid is not working, it is destructive, we need to shift.  But I doubt 
that donors are thinking this way” (author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).  Rather than 
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empowering citizens, “Aid offers Band-Aids, not a cure, for example aid for homeless shelters 
versus stopping demolitions” (author interview, East Jerusalem, July 21, 2016).   
Our interviewees were skeptical that patronage did any good, “We don’t have any real 
impact studies of INDH.  But it is very much needed” (author interview, Rabat, October 24, 
2014).  Many argued that it did great harm, “As a sector the NGOs effectiveness changed 
dramatically after the INDH.  For one, it became a much larger sector, there were far fewer 
NGOs before, and now there are many, and second, many lost their militancy, their mandate, 
their original goals, and became corrupted by the influx of funds into the sector.  So, I believe 
that the efficacy of the sector has declined dramatically” (author interview, Rabat, October 2, 
2014).   
8.0 Conclusion 
NGOs are thought to operate as sites of citizen empowerment, operating in a public 
sphere between society and the state.  Yet, as many scholars have argued, they often fail to 
realize their theorized role as the bedrock of an active, engaged and accountable civil society.  In 
cases where NGOs have become reliant on patronage, NGO sectors have experienced bloating 
and a systematic change in their role within civil society.  There are numerous cases worldwide 
where NGOs have become beholden to their patrons, to the detriment of local civil society and 
social change. This is neither a Middle East phenomenon nor simply a Global South 
phenomenon but has been observed by researchers in Western contexts (Alexander et al., 2004; 
Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Ferris, 1993; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). 
Using the cases of Palestine and Morocco, we argue that under patronage and via three 
key technologies of governing—professionalization, bureaucratization and upward 
accountability—NGOs became an apparatus of governing.  Playing new roles as agents of 
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governing limited their ability to act as agents of change.  Patronage depoliticized NGOs, 
ultimately threatening their long-term legitimacy and sustainability.  
These findings have implications for understanding the transformation of NGOs, the 
relationship between patrons and their grantees, and finally for exploring the limitations of 
NGOs as vehicles for social change in sensitive political environments.  While much of the 
literature attributes the negative impacts of patronage to the source of patronage—foreign or tied 
to the government—we assert that the changed role of NGOs as apparatuses of governing is just 
as important as the identity of the patron, and is manifested no matter what the identity of the 
patron.  While foreign aid is problematized for being foreign, Western, and imperialist, and 
government funding is criticized for prioritizing the interests of the state over those of citizens, 
our findings indicate that similar patterns of power relations emerge between patrons and NGOs 
regardless of the source of patronage. We find this phenomenon present in two dramatically 
different contexts; one NGO sector fueled by foreign aid (Palestine) and in another fueled by the 
government (Morocco).  A diverse array of self-help groups, charitable societies, popular 
committees and small informal activist networks strongly connected to their communities and 
working for radical social change were sidelined in favor of professional, bureaucratic and 
upwardly accountable institutions. Tethered to their patrons, these organizations were 
increasingly alienated from local citizens and debilitated from serving as change agents of civil 
society. 
Our research captures a particular moment in time and focuses on the relationship 
between patrons and NGOs.  As patron interests change and political realities on the ground also 
transform, funding levels fluctuate and NGOs respond.  Organizations morph, merge, dissolve 
and sometimes staff move and start their own independent organizations or even abandon formal 
 25 
NGOs and move into “informal and grassroots forms of civic engagement” and social activism 
(Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017, p. 315).  While understanding the long-term impacts of 
patronage on civil society requires future research, our research demonstrates the ways in which 
funders profoundly impact NGOs and in turn potentially change the tides within civil society.  
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